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OVERVIEW — This issue brief provides an overview of Medicare’s coverage
gaps and the primary sources of supplemental coverage for Medicare benefi-
ciaries. It focuses particularly on the Medigap market: the effects of standard-
ization, recent premium trends and rating practices, and options for reform.
It considers Medigap within the context of Medicare prescription drug pro-
posals and efforts to reform the entire Medicare program.
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Medigap: Prevalence, Premiums,
and Opportunities for Reform
Medicare has played a critical role in providing access to health care
services for millions of beneficiaries since its inception in 1965. Recent
attention, however, has focused on its significant gaps in coverage. Leg-
islative proposals to provide a Medicare drug benefit have increased
awareness of the program’s inadequacies and its failure to keep pace
with shifts in the private sector’s benefit design. The Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission’s most recent report to Congress examines the
limitations of Medicare’s traditional benefit package, including substan-
tial cost-sharing requirements and very limited or no coverage of im-
portant benefits like outpatient drugs. Moreover, Medicare provides no
ceiling on out-of-pocket spending.
Modeled on private health insurance available in the mid-1960s, Medi-
care was designed to cover hospital and physician services for acute
illness. Since very few working adults purchased supplemental insur-
ance, it was generally believed that most Medicare beneficiaries would
not need additional coverage. But the cost-sharing provisions that may
have been appropriate for the working-age population proved to be too
burdensome for many Medicare beneficiaries. By the late 1960s, more
than 45 percent of Medicare beneficiaries held private health insurance
to supplement their Medicare coverage.1  Presently, the overwhelming
majority of Medicare beneficiaries have some form of coverage in addi-
tion to Medicare.2
Four types of supplemental coverage prevail today: employer-sponsored
retiree health insurance, Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans, Medicaid, and
individually purchased Medigap insurance. The prevalence of retiree
health insurance and M+C options have declined recently, forcing many
seniors to look for other ways to fill Medicare’s gaps. Medicaid as a
supplement is available to only the poorest Medicare beneficiaries.
Medigap—private health insurance designed to wrap around Medicare’s
benefit package—is the only supplemental insurance still broadly avail-
able to most beneficiaries.
As options have narrowed for seniors, policymakers have begun to
consider how Medigap plans fit into the larger puzzle of Medicare
reform. Several bills have been introduced in Congress that include
provisions related to Medigap, particularly within the context of Medi-
care prescription drug proposals.3  The Bush administration has also
put forth some Medigap proposals as part of its overall framework for
Medicare reform.
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MEDICARE’S COVERAGE GAPS
Medicare’s basic benefit design mirrored the private insurance system
in place in the mid-1960s. Its benefit package is generally limited to
acute care services that are needed for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury.4
Traditional Medicare consists of two parts. Part A, the Hospital Insur-
ance (HI) program, helps pay for inpatient hospital, skilled nursing fa-
cility, hospice, and certain home health care services. Individuals who
receive Social Security cash benefits on the basis of age or disability are
automatically entitled to Part A benefits. While there is no premium for
this coverage, beneficiaries are liable for required deductibles, coinsur-
ance, and copayment amounts (see Table 1). Part B, the Supplementary
Medical Insurance (SMI) program, helps pay for physician services, out-
patient hospital and other outpatient facility services, home care not
covered under Part A, and other services, such as diagnostic tests, du-
rable medical equipment, ambulance services, and some preventive ser-
vices. Part B is voluntary, but 95 percent of beneficiaries enroll. Benefi-
ciaries must pay a monthly premium for Part B coverage ($54 in 2002)
and are also responsible for deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance
(see Table 1).
Beneficiaries are exposed to potentially significant “front-end” and “back-
end” costs.5  Front-end costs, such as deductibles, must be met before
any program benefits are paid. In 2002, beneficiaries face a $812 deduct-
ible for each inpatient hospitalization covered under Part A and a $100
annual deductible for Part B covered services. On the back end, benefi-
ciaries are vulnerable for high daily copayments associated with long-
term stays in hospitals or skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). About 30 per-
cent of beneficiaries in SNFs continue to stay in nursing facilities after
they exhaust the Medicare benefit.6  Moreover, because Medicare has no
stop-loss coverage, beneficiaries can be liable for high out-of-pocket
expenses, especially those with chronic health care needs.
In addition, Medicare provides no coverage for many services and prod-
ucts typically needed by beneficiaries, such as long-term nursing home
care, most outpatient prescription drugs, eyeglasses, and hearing aids
(see Table 2). According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO),
“current estimates suggest that the combination of Medicare’s cost-shar-
ing requirements and limited benefits leaves about 45 percent of benefi-
ciaries’ health care costs uncovered.”7  In 2000, elderly Medicare benefi-
ciaries spent an average of $3,142 out of pocket, or 21.7 percent of in-
come, on their own health care expenses.8
SOURCES OF SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE
To limit their exposure to traditional Medicare’s coverage limits, about
90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries obtain some type of supplemental
Because Medicare has
no stop-loss coverage,
beneficiaries can be li-
able for high out-of-
pocket expenses.
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TABLE 1
Cost-Sharing Requirements in Traditional Medicare
(Parts A and B), 2002
  REQUIREMENT    2002 AMOUNTS
Inpatient
Deductible $812 per illness spell
Copayment for days 61–90 $203 per day
Copayment for lifetime reserve days 91–150 $406 per day
Copayment beyond day 150 100% of costs
Skilled Nursing Facility Care
Copayment for days 21–100 $101.50 per day
Copayment beyond day 100 100% of costs
Home Health Care
Coinsurance for durable medical equipment 20% of approved amount
Hospice Care
Copayment for outpatient drugs $5 or less for outpatient drugs
Coinsurance for inpatient respite care 5% of approved amount
Blood
First 3 pints 100% of costs
  REQUIREMENT    2002 AMOUNTS
Premium $54 per month
Deductible $100 per year
Physician & Other Medical Services
Coinsurance 20% of approved amount
Coinsurance for mental health 50% of approved amount
Copayment for services of physicians 100% of allowable excess
not accepting assignment
Home Health Care
Coinsurance for durable medical equipment 20% of approved amount
Outpatient Hospital Care Coinsurance or copayment
varies according to service
(after Part B deductible)
Blood
First 3 pints 100% of costs
Additional Pints 20% of approved amount
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Medicare and You 2002” (CMS-
10050), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Baltimore, September 2002.
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coverage. While supplemental coverage has existed virtually since the
creation of Medicare in 1965, sources and types of coverage have changed
over time. The majority of beneficiaries obtain additional health cover-
age from four sources: employer-sponsored retiree health insurance,
Medicare+Choice, Medicaid, and Medigap (see Figure 1).
Retiree Health Insurance
Employer-sponsored retiree health insurance is the
largest source of supplemental coverage for Medi-
care beneficiaries, with about 33 percent of all ben-
eficiaries obtaining coverage from their or their
spouse’s former or current employer.9  This cover-
age tends to be the most comprehensive and least
expensive to beneficiaries. According to a survey
conducted in 2001 by the Henry J. Kaiser Founda-
tion, the Hospital Research and Educational Trust
(HRET), and the Commonwealth Fund, nearly all (99
percent) Medicare-age retirees (65 and older) with
employer-sponsored health benefits had prescription
drug coverage in the firm’s largest retiree health
plan.10  Retirees in employer-sponsored plans typi-
cally receive more in drug benefits and pay less in
out-of-pocket expenses than beneficiaries in other
supplemental plans. However, beneficiaries with
employer-sponsored retiree health insurance typically
still pay some portion of Medicare deductibles and
face greater point-of-service cost sharing than those
with individually purchased Medigap policies.11
Medicare-age retirees contribute $50 per month on
average for single coverage.
Large firms are substantially more likely than small
firms to offer retiree health benefits. Nearly two-
thirds (64 percent) of firms with 5,000 or more work-
ers offered retiree health benefits in 2001, while only
3 percent of firms with 3 to 199 workers did.12  Ben-
efits are more likely to be available to retirees in
some employment sectors, such as finance and manu-
facturing, than in others, such as service industries.
The prevalence of employer-sponsored health cov-
erage for Medicare-eligible retirees has declined in
recent years, with some employers dropping cover-
age and few newer employers adding retiree health
coverage. Since 1997, the percentage of all firms of-
fering health benefits to Medicare-age retirees has
declined, from 31 percent of all firms with 200 or
TABLE 2
Products and Services Not Covered
by Traditional Medicare, 2002
Outpatient prescription drugs (with limited exceptions)
Routine or annual physical exams
Hearing exams and hearing aids
Routine eye care and most eyeglasses
Dental care and dentures (in most cases)
Screening tests
(except for those specifically identified by Medicare)
Routine foot care (with limited exceptions)
Orthopedic shoes
Vaccinations
(except for those specifically identified by Medicare)
Long-term custodial care at home or in a
nursing home (help with bathing, dressing,
using the bathroom, and eating)
Acupuncture
Cosmetic surgery
Health care received while traveling outside of
the United States (except in limited cases)
Private-duty nursing
Note: Medicare covers drugs not usually self-administered, oral
anticancer drugs, drugs used following an organ transplant,
erythropoietin for beneficiaries on dialysis, and injectable drugs
used for treatment of postmenopausal osteoporosis. Screening
tests covered by Medicare include bone mass measurement for
some at-risk beneficiaries; colorectal cancer screening; glucose
monitors, test strips, and lancets for all diabetics; diabetes self-
management training for at-risk diabetics; glaucoma screening
for at-risk enrollees; mammograms; pap tests and pelvic exams
(including clinical breast exams) for all women; and prostate
cancer screening for all men age 50 and over. Vaccinations cov-
ered by Medicare include those for flu, pneumococcal pneumonia,
and hepatitis B (for those at medium to high risk).
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2002.
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more workers to 23 percent in
2001. However, in the vast ma-
jority of cases where large em-
ployers have terminated retiree
health coverage, the change was
made on a prospective basis, for
future retirees only.13  And, while
fewer employers sponsor retiree
health benefits today, the per-
centage of retirees obtaining
health benefits through an em-
ployer remained relatively stable
between 1994 and 1999, covering
about 57 percent of retirees aged
55 to 64 and providing Medicare
supplemental coverage to about
32 percent of retirees 65 or
older.14
Nonetheless, firms offering re-
tiree health benefits have re-
ported that they have made sub-
stantial changes in their benefit
design and/or cost-sharing requirements since 1999. According to the
Kaiser/HRET/Commonwealth survey, more than half (53 percent) of
employers offering retiree health benefits reported increasing the retir-
ees’ share of premiums in the past two years.15  One of every three firms
(32 percent) increased cost-sharing for prescription drug coverage in
the past two years. Many firms predict that they will increase retiree
cost-sharing over the next two years. In testimony before Congress,
William J. Scanlon, director of health care issues for the GAO, stated
that “increasing cost pressures on employers, such as rising premiums
and a weakening economy, suggest that erosion in retiree health ben-
efits may continue.”16
Medicare+Choice
Nationally, about 15 percent of older and disabled Americans get their
Medicare-covered services through private M+C plans. This figure has
declined from about 18 percent in 1999.17  While they place some restric-
tions on choice of doctors and hospitals, M+C plans have attracted ben-
eficiaries generally because they offer additional benefits to Medicare,
such as prescription drugs and vision care, at low premiums. While M+C
is not synonymous with supplemental insurance, its enrollees typically
have benefits beyond the traditional Medicare package. Since the early
1990s, many beneficiaries turned to M+C plans to obtain the sort of
benefits available in costly Medigap policies at lower or no costs, par-
ticularly prescription drug benefits.
FIGURE 1
Sources of Additional Health Coverage
for Medicare Beneficiaries, 1999
Note: Sample of 11,859 consists of community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries in 1999. Medigap
also includes those with both Medigap and employer-sponsored coverage, as well as those with
only Medigap coverage.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, Cost and Use file, 1999. Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, Report to the Congress: Assessing Medicare Benefits, June 2002, 17.
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Access to M+C coverage is hardly universal among Medicare beneficia-
ries. In 2002, only 61 percent of beneficiaries had access to at least one
M+C plan in their county, down from 72 percent in 1999.18  Differences in
access between urban and rural beneficiaries are striking. According to
an analysis by Mathematica Policy Research, 95 percent of Medicare ben-
eficiaries in central urban areas had access to at least one M+C plan in
2002, while only 19 percent of those who resided in a “rural-urban fringe”
area did and only 5 percent of those in other rural locales did.
Considerable variation exists in the design and expansiveness of M+C
benefits, as well as in the structure of the copayments for hospitaliza-
tion and physician visits. Widespread withdrawals by health plans from
the M+C marketplace since 1999 have resulted in fewer M+C plans avail-
able to beneficiaries and in higher premiums and less generous benefit
packages for those who do participate.19  According to the Mathematica
analysis, for those who had to pay a premium, the average monthly cost
has risen from $32.11 in 1999 to $54.05 in 2002.20  Prescription drug cov-
erage has declined from 84 percent in 1999 to 72 percent in 2002. Ge-
neric-only drug coverage has increased from 12 percent in 2001 to 40
percent in 2002. Annual prescription drug limits of $500 or less have also
become more common. Eighty percent of M+C enrollees have inpatient
hospital cost sharing in 2002, and more enrollees have been required to
pay increased copayments for outpatient services.
Advocates and counselors have expressed concern that M+C plans have
become more like traditional Medicare in terms of the cost-sharing bur-
den on vulnerable beneficiaries, such as the low-income and chronically
ill. Yet those beneficiaries who still have an M+C option usually take it
because it still provides comparatively good coverage for the price.21
Medicaid
State Medicaid programs provide help with some or all of the health
care costs that Medicare does not cover for certain low-income, sick,
and disabled Medicare beneficiaries. About 11 percent of community-
dwelling beneficiaries received supplemental coverage through Medic-
aid in 1999.22
By federal law, state Medicaid programs must pay Part B premiums and
Medicare cost-sharing expenses for low-income Medicare beneficiaries
who qualify for Supplemental Security Income, or who are deemed to
be medically needy.23  These beneficiaries are also eligible for all benefits
provided by their state Medicaid program, such as coverage for pre-
ventive services, prescription drugs, and long-term nursing home care.
Other low-income beneficiaries who do not qualify for full Medicaid
benefits may be eligible for additional programs that help pay for Medi-
care premiums and/or cost sharing, such as the Qualified Medicare Ben-
eficiary and the Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary programs.24
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Because Medicaid eligibility is dependent on income, Medicare benefi-
ciaries may go on and off Medicaid as a result of income fluctuations,
making it a somewhat unstable means of supplementing Medicare cov-
erage. More commonly, at least among elderly beneficiaries, studies have
shown that fewer than half of those eligible for Medicaid assistance
actually enroll. Analysts have attributed this low participation rate to
lack of awareness of the program, the stigma associated with Medicaid,
and barriers to enrollment (for example, complex enrollment processes).25
Medigap
Since many employers do not offer retiree health insurance, M+C plans
are not available in many parts of the country, and Medicaid eligibility
is dependent on income, private Medigap insurance is the only supple-
mental insurance option widely available to seniors. According to one
estimate, 24.3 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had Medigap policies in
fall 1999 (see Table 3).26
A review of studies on supplemental coverage, conducted by the Medi-
care Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), found those beneficia-
ries who were most likely to purchase individual Medigap policies tended
to be “older, female, white, more educated, and wealthier than benefi-
ciaries who did not purchase Medigap policies.”27  Rural beneficiaries
were much more likely to have a Medigap policy than beneficiaries in
urban areas, who often had more options.
Because of the complexities of the private supplemental insurance mar-
ket and the relative inattention to it in policy circles of late, the remain-
der of this paper focuses on the Medigap market and how it relates to
current options for reform.
MEDIGAP STANDARDIZATION
The individual Medigap market has been subject to a number of prob-
lems, which has resulted in a great deal of federal regulation since the
1980s. Congress enacted the “Baucus amendments” of 1980 (P.L. 96-265)
in response to marketing abuses, duplication of coverage, and consumer
confusion within the Medigap market. This legislation established crite-
ria for a voluntary certification program of qualified Medigap plans that
was widely implemented by most states. Under the Baucus amendment
criteria, Medigap policies had to meet minimum benefit package stan-
dards and minimum loss ratios28  and comply with various disclosure
requirements to prospective policyholders.
The Baucus amendments reduced marketing abuses and ensured that
policies provided minimum coverage, yet consumers still faced hundreds
of different configurations of benefits available.29  Many were subject to
abusive sales practices and purchased multiple policies, which often du-
plicated existing coverage. To address these problems, Congress enacted
Rural beneficiaries were
much more likely to have
a Medigap policy than
beneficiaries in urban ar-
eas, who often had more
options.
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TABLE 3
Percentage of Medicare Beneficiaries with Various Types of Supplemental
 Insurance Coverage, by Selected Beneficiary Characteristics, Fall 1999
Medicare Medicare Employer- Other FFS Medicare
Beneficiaries Medicaid HMO Sponsored Medigap Public Only
All Beneficiaries
By percent 100.0% 10.9% 17.3% 33.1% 24.3%       1.9% 12.5%
By number (millions) 34.6 3.8 6.0 11.5 8.4 0.7 4.3
Age
 Under 65 4.4% 32.5% 8.5% 21.3% 6.0% 3.7% 28.0%
 65 – 74 15.7 7.3 19.9 36.1 23.6 1.9 11.3
 75 – 84 11.4 7.3 17.8 34.8 30.3 1.1 8.8
 85 and older 3.2 11.7 15.3 28.7 32.0 2.2 10.3
Metro Status
 Rural 8.3 12.1 3.2 30.4 35.4 2.3 16.6
 Urban 26.3 10.5 21.8 34.0 20.8 1.8 11.2
Gender
 Male 15.3 8.9 17.3 33.7 22.4 2.0 15.7
 Female 19.3 12.5 17.4 32.5 25.8 1.8 9.9
Race / Ethnicity
 White (non-Hispanic) 27.7 6.6 17.1 36.5 27.8 1.5 10.6
 Black (non-Hispanic) 3.1 27.3 17.2 20.6 7.4 2.4 25.2
 Hispanic (any race) 2.5 30.7 20.8 17.1 11.3 5.1 15.1
 Other race/ethnicity 0.9 31.7 21.3 15.4 13.5 3.1 15.1
Income
 $10,000 or less 7.9 37.4 12.8 10.9 17.2 3.6 18.1
 $10,001 – $20,000 9.2 6.3 20.8 28.3 26.4 2.2 16.0
 $20,001 – $30,000 5.7 1.1 19.7 43.2 27.2 1.0 7.9
 More than $30,000 9.2 0.4 15.4 50.7 25.9 0.8 6.9
Self-Reported Health Status
 Excellent/Very Good 14.2 5.2 20.3 36.9 26.0 1.3 10.4
 Good 10.9 10.1 17.0 33.8 26.0 1.8 11.4
 Fair/Poor 9.5 20.4 13.4 26.5 19.9 2.9 16.9
Chronic Conditions
 None 4.3 9.9 18.9 30.5 21.2 1.4 18.2
 1 – 2 16.3 8.8 18.2 33.8 24.8 2.0 12.4
 3 – 4 11.3 12.1 16.5 33.3 25.3 1.8 11.0
 5 or more 2.6 20.5 13.1 31.7 22.1 2.8 9.8
Estimates are based on beneficiaries’ insurance coverage status in the fall of 1999 and apply to noninstitutionalized beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare
for the entire year. Chi-square tests of independence between each beneficiary characteristic and sources of supplemental insurance coverage were
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Chronic conditions include heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, osteoporosis,
broken hip, pulmonary disease, stroke, Parkinson’s disease, and urinary incontinence that occurs at least once a week. Employer-sponsored current and
employer-sponsored retiree coverage are combined under “employer-sponsored.” FFS is fee-for-service.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey Access to Care data, Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, February 27, 2002, W133.
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significant reforms in the Medigap market as part of the Omnibus Bud-
get Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990).
OBRA 1990 replaced voluntary state certification with national require-
ments that all Medigap policies sold after July 1992 conform to one of 10
uniform benefit packages (except in three exempted states).30 The pro-
cess undertaken to establish the benefit packages was unique in that
Congress gave a private entity, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), the authority to formulate the specifications.
The ten benefit packages were developed by a working group, com-
posed of both insurers and consumers, under the auspices of NAIC.31
The ten standardized Medigap options (labeled A, B, C, . . . J) are shown
in Table 4. All plans cover a core set of services, and the benefits gener-
ally increase in comprehensiveness from A through J. Standardization
was designed to facilitate comparison shopping for consumers. In addi-
tion, standardization eliminated some benefits (such as private-duty
nursing) that, while purchased by some consumers, may not have pro-
vided much value in relation to their costs.32
OBRA 1990 also contained several other provisions related to Medigap,
including the following:33
TABLE 4
Medigap Plans A through J
Covered Benefits A B C D E F* G H I J*
Core Benefits ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Part A Deductible ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SNF Coinsurance ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Foreign Travel Emergency ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
At-Home Recovery ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Part B Deductible ✓ ✓ ✓
Part B Excess Charges ✓ a ✓ ✓
Prescription Drugs b b c
Preventive Medical Care ✓
* Plans F and J also have a high-deductible option under which covered individuals
must pay a deductible ($1,620 in 2002) before the plan pays anything.
a Plan G pays 80 percent of the difference between the physician’s charge and the
Medicare allowable rate; Plans F, I, and J pay 100 percent.
b After $250 deductible, the policy covers 50 percent of prescription drug costs to
a maximum of $1,250.
c After $250 deductible, the policy covers 50 percent of prescription drug costs to
a maximum of $3,000.
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Notes: SNF = Skilled Nursing Facility
Plan types A–J represent the 10 uniform
benefit packages mandated by OBRA 1990.
Plan A represents the least comprehensive package.
Plan J represents the most comprehensive.
This chart does not apply for individuals living
in Massachusetts, Minnesota, or Wisconsin.
11
NHPF Issue Brief No.782 / September 9, 2002
■ Requiring insurers to hold a six-month open-enrollment period
when beneficiaries 65 years or older first enroll in Part B. During this
six-month window, beneficiaries cannot be denied coverage or be
charged more based on their health status.
■ Increasing the minimum loss ratio requirements for individual
policies.
■ Instituting severe penalties for agents and insurers who knowingly
sell duplicate coverage.
■ Limiting agents’ commissions during the initial year of coverage
under a new policy to reduce the incentive to “churn” or switch
coverage to earn additional commissions.
■ Requiring that pre-existing condition exclusions not exceed six
months in duration.
Policy standardization appears to have had a major impact on the
Medigap market. The range of premiums narrowed significantly be-
tween 1991 and 1994, indicating that premiums had become more com-
petitive and consumers were better able to assess policy value.34 Yet
concerns remained about the adequacy and desirability of the benefits
available and the risk for adverse selection.
MEDIGAP PLAN DISTRIBUTION
AND PREMIUM TRENDS
Since the creation of the 10 standardized plans, most Medigap plan en-
rollment has been concentrated in two plans: F and C. MedPAC analysis
of 2000 NAIC data found that 35 percent of Medigap policyholders en-
rolled in standardized plans were in Plan F, and 26 percent were in Plan
C.35  These plans offer identical benefits, with the exception that Plan F
also provides full coverage for Part B charges in excess of the amount
Medicare will allow.36  Plans A and B each comprise 10 percent of policy-
holders in standardized plans. Altogether, the three plans with stan-
dardized prescription drug coverage (H, I, and J) comprised about 9
percent of the market in 2000.
Nationally, a few insurers dominate the Medigap market. In 1999, 64
percent of Medigap policies were sold by either United HealthCare or a
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan.37  United HealthCare offers all ten stan-
dardized plans to AARP members during the initial open enrollment
period in nearly all states. All insurers marketing Medigap policies must
offer Plan A. Many offer Plans B, C, and F, but few offer the other six
plans, especially those that cover prescription drugs.
Medigap plans are guaranteed renewable. Therefore, once an individual
purchases a policy, it cannot be cancelled (except for failure to pay the
premiums). However, insurers are not prevented from increasing pre-
miums over time. Furthermore, if someone decides to change policies,
he or she could be subject to underwriting practices.
What All Medigap Plans [A-J]
Must Cover (Core Benefits)
The Medicare Part A coinsurance
amount for days 61–90 ($203 per day
in 2002), and days 91–150 ($406 per
day in 2002) of a hospital stay.
The cost of 365 extra days of hospital
care during the insured’s lifetime
after Medicare coverage ends.
The Medicare Part B coinsurance or
copayment amount.
The first three pints of blood each
year.
What Medigap Policies
Do Not Cover
Long-term care
Vision or dental care
Hearing aids
Private-duty nursing
Unlimited prescription drugs
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OBRA 1990 permitted policies issued before July 1992 (OBRA 1990’s ef-
fective date) to stay in place. In 2000, about 31 percent of individual
Medigap policies in force were these so-called prestandard policies. The
number of individuals enrolled in these plans continues to decline each
year as enrollees age and die.
Medigap policies can be expensive, particularly for seniors on fixed in-
comes. The average annual Medigap premium was more than $1,300 in
1999 (see Figure 2). In addition to the variations in cost based on level of
coverage, premiums vary widely from state to state, city to city, and
insurer to insurer. Consumers buying Medigap in California, Indiana,
and Florida, for example, can be charged as much as four times more
than consumers in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Montana.38
* Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have alternative plans in
effect and waivers that exempt them from selling the national standard
Medigap plans.
Notes: Data reported by insurers to the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) do not include plan type for policies repre-
FIGURE 2
Percentage of Covered Lives in Various Medigap Plans
and
Average Annual Plan Premiums per Covered Life, 1999
senting less than 8 percent of Medigap policy covered lives, with an
average paid premium of $1,275. These plans are not included in the
table.
Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO-02-533T).
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Annual tracking of premium quotes by Weiss Ratings Inc., an indepen-
dent firm that collects premium data on behalf of the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services, has found that premium quotes can vary
widely for the same plan type offered by different insurers for the same
individual, even in the same location.39  For example, in 2002 in Texas,
the rate quoted for Plan F varies from a low of $887 to a high of $2,487
for a 65-year-old woman. In Arkansas, prices quoted for Plan J ranged
from $2,878 to $9,376.
Medigap policyholders have also faced a pattern of erratic and often
unpredictable increases in premiums. Averaged across all states, the
growth in average premiums across all plan types from 1997 to 1999 was
modest, ranging from less than 1 percent to about 3 percent. However,
from state to state, premium changes were dramatic. According to
Deborah Chollet and Adele Kirk, “median premium changes ranged
from less than 1 percent (in policy form J, where enrollment typically is
very low) to more than 23 percent in policy form B. The median increase
in average prestandard premiums was nearly 16 percent.”40
RATING PRACTICES
Insurers’ rating practices play an important role in determining the
Medigap premium. While federal and some state laws provide some
protections for consumers, Medigap insurers are still permitted to screen
for health conditions when issuing policies beyond the initial open en-
rollment period.
OBRA 1990 requires an open enrollment period when an individual is
age 65 or older and first enrolled in Medicare Part B. During this enroll-
ment period, Medigap insurers are not permitted to deny coverage or
discriminate in setting premiums on the basis of an applicant’s health
(that is, to underwrite). Beyond these provisions, OBRA 1990 did not
address underwriting or rating practices. The Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (BBA) prohibited underwriting during specific additional times,
such as when a beneficiary loses M+C coverage due to plan termination,
or when a Medicare beneficiary loses employer-sponsored health ben-
efits. These additional guaranteed issue rights are only extended to plan
types A, B, C, or F, and do not extend to plans that include prescription
drug coverage. Outside of these federal protections and some limited
state restrictions, Medigap insurers are still permitted to underwrite.
The underwriting practices that prevail outside of this narrow open en-
rollment period has significantly limited the ability of consumers to switch
policies or carriers when they wish. According to Chollet and Kirk,“ most
Medicare beneficiaries may have no real option ever to change their in-
surer or particular Medigap policy for the rest of their lives.”41
The standardization of Medigap plans in 1992 encouraged market com-
petition around price rather than product differentiation. This shift has
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led to a move away from community and issue-age rating to attained-age
rating as carriers try to attract younger beneficiaries. A 1997 study con-
ducted by the Lewin Group found that fewer insurers were charging the
same premiums for all policyholders (community rating) or basing premi-
ums on the policyholder’s age at the time of initial purchase (issue-age
rating).42  Instead, the majority of insurers appeared to be basing premi-
ums on the current age of the policyholder (attained-age rating). Outside
of mandatory open enrollment periods and guaranteed issue situations,
most insurers underwrite, so people may face higher rates due to health
status. The study found that, in many markets, only plans sponsored by
AARP offered community-rated policies. As a result, these AARP-spon-
sored plans often become the insurer of last resort when age-rated plans
become too expensive for those with health conditions.
Some states have gone beyond federal requirements and have limited
underwriting and insurance practices in the Medigap market. Eight states
(Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wash-
ington) have mandatory community rating. Ten states have banned at-
tained age rating and six have prohibited entry-age rating.43  A few other
states require continuous open enrollment or annual open enrollment.
In addressing Medigap rating practices, there is an inherent tension be-
tween federal and state authorities. States traditionally regulate insur-
ance markets, but OBRA 1990 set a new precedent in federal oversight
and control. Establishing new federal requirements regarding enroll-
ment and underwriting practices would likely be met by strong resis-
tance from states and insurers.
Medigap coverage for younger, disabled beneficiaries is another issue
that has been raised when looking at underwriting practices. Individu-
als under 65 who become eligible for Medicare because of a disability
account for 13 percent of all beneficiaries, but only 1 percent of Medigap
policyholders. This is largely because insurers are not required to ex-
tend the mandatory initial open-enrollment period to beneficiaries un-
der 65. Extending mandatory open enrollment to these individuals could
greatly increase their access to Medigap insurance; however, because
they are likely to have greater claims, premiums may not be affordable
and may increase for other Medigap policyholders.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
Prescription Drug Coverage
Prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries has been the sub-
ject of intense congressional debate. As various options are being con-
sidered, it is important to understand the role of Medigap in providing
prescription drug coverage and the potential impact of a Medicare drug
benefit on Medigap policyholders.
Insurers use different methods
in pricing Medigap policies.
Community Rating — Premiums
are based on the cost of providing
coverage in local areas and not on
health status or age.
Issue-age Rating — Premiums are
based on the policyholder’s age at
the time of initial purchase. Premi-
ums will not increase as much as
attained-age policies over time.
Attained-age Rating — Premiums
are based on the current age of
the policyholder. Premiums can in-
crease significantly as the policy-
holder grows older.
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As stated earlier, three standardized Medigap plans—Plans H, I, and J—
provide coverage for prescription drugs. While about 10.7 million Medi-
care beneficiaries had a Medigap plan in 1999, only about 25 percent have
purchased drug coverage through Medigap. A large number of these
policyholders are in prestandard plans, and their coverage is believed
to be less generous than that offered in the standard policies.44  Since
mid-1992, just 8 percent of those purchasing standardized Medigap poli-
cies bought one that covers prescription drugs.45  These low coverage
levels are generally attributed to three reasons: price, benefit design,
and failure of competition.
Price — Medigap plans with drug coverage tend to be more expensive
than those without drug coverage. In 2000, annual premiums for stan-
dardized plans that include outpatient prescription drug coverage ranged
from $1,308 for plan H (cap of $1,250 on prescription drugs) to $2,112
for Plan J (cap of $3,000), with an average premium of $1,776 across all
three plan types that cover drugs. This compares to an average annual
premium of $1,150 for standardized plans without prescription drug
coverage. However, premium rates can vary widely based on the age
and health status of the applicant, and guaranteed issue rights do not
extend to plans that include drug coverage, beyond the initial open en-
rollment period.
Benefit Design — Because Medigap’s standardized policies provide lim-
ited coverage for prescription drugs, beneficiaries who purchase this
coverage can still be exposed to significant out-of-pocket expenses. The
Medigap prescription drug benefit has a $250 annual deductible, re-
quires 50 percent coinsurance, and limits plan liability to $1,250 or $3,000,
depending on which plan type is purchased. These dollar amounts have
not been increased since they were established in 1992.
According to the GAO, Medigap policyholders with prescription drug
coverage spent, on average in 1998, $548 out of pocket on prescription
drugs.46  Medigap paid only 27 percent of policyholders’ drug costs.
Medigap policyholders without drug coverage spent, on average $618—
about 13 percent more than beneficiaries with drug coverage. Accord-
ing to a recent survey, Medigap drug coverage appears to offer the least
financial protection of supplemental coverage currently available.47  The
survey found that Medigap policyholders reported higher out-of-pocket
prescription drug costs than groups covered by other sources (for ex-
ample, Medicaid, employer, health maintenance organization [HMO],
and state drug program), despite taking a similar number of medica-
tions, or fewer, than other covered groups. Thus, many beneficiaries
may be acting rationally in choosing not to purchase Medigap drug cov-
erage, since the benefit can be of limited value to them.
Lack of Competition — Another reason for the rapid growth in premi-
ums for Medigap plans with drug coverage relates to the way the benefits
are managed in the Medigap marketplace. Unlike employer-sponsored
Since mid-1992, just 8 per-
cent of those purchasing
standardized Medigap
policies bought one that
covers prescription drugs.
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plans, which typically hire pharmacy benefit managers to control drug
costs, and Medicaid, which receives rebates from pharmaceutical manu-
facturers, Medigap policyholders sometimes pay full retail price. Indi-
vidual Medigap plans provide no real incentives for insurers to bargain
with drug manufacturers or retailers for lower prices; nonetheless, most
Medigap insurers do offer drug discount programs.
Between 1994 and 1999, 56 percent of the beneficiaries that left the
Medigap market went to a Medicare HMO.48  The availability of pre-
scription drug coverage in Medicare HMOs contributed greatly to this
switch. Now, in the wake of widespread withdrawals in the M+C mar-
kets and reduced drug benefits, some beneficiaries may seek to re-enter
the Medigap market. Due to underwriting practices, however, plans
may not be accepting new enrollees in their drug plans and the costs
may be prohibitive.
The introduction of a prescription drug benefit for all Medicare benefi-
ciaries, therefore, may have a limited impact on the Medigap market.
However, if beneficiaries are forced to choose between paying a Medigap
premium or a drug benefit premium, those on fixed incomes may face a
dilemma.
The Bush administration has proposed the addition of two new Medigap
plans to the existing ten standardized plans. One, like the current Plan J,
would provide coverage for additional drug expenses, but with a higher
stop-loss limit and reduced coverage of Medicare cost-sharing.49  How-
ever, insurers have warned that more generous Medigap drug cover-
age might lead to severe adverse selection for those insurers who
choose to offer it.50  Adverse selection occurs because those who ex-
pect to receive the most in benefits from the policy will purchase it
immediately, while those who expect to have few claims will forego
purchasing it. Insurers maintain that the requirement that Medigap
policies be “guaranteed renewable” already exacerbates problems with
creating affordable insurance.
First-Dollar Coverage
All ten of the standardized Medigap plans cover Part A and Part B coin-
surance, and three plans cover the Part B deductible, shielding benefi-
ciaries from most Medicare cost-sharing requirements. This so-called
“first-dollar coverage” has generated significant policy discussion over
the past two decades. Several studies have examined the relationship
between Medicare supplemental insurance and Medicare expenditures
and have consistently found that supplemental insurance is associated
with increased costs to the Medicare program.51  Another issue is that
none of the standardized policies allow consumers to choose higher
deductibles in return for lower premiums and complete stop-loss cover-
age—often referred to as “catastrophic” insurance.
Supplemental insur-
ance is associated with
increased costs to the
Medicare program.
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MedPAC states that
making beneficiaries responsible for some of the marginal costs of ser-
vices would increase their price sensitivity and encourage them to be
more judicious in their use of care. This, in turn, would reduce Medi-
care spending. Changes of this sort also would likely result in lower
Medigap premiums or, at a minimum, slower premium increases, mak-
ing Medigap a more affordable option.52
The Bush administration’s two new Medigap options would cover all of
the coinsurance for extended hospital stays in the same way that cur-
rent Medigap plans do, but they would not cover the Part B deductible.
The administration believes these options would appeal to beneficiaries
who want lower premiums but have not chosen to enroll in one of the
two high-deductible options, which were created under the BBA and
have not proven to be popular. These high-deductible options, available
for plans F and J, require beneficiaries to pay a $1,620 deductible before
either plan covers any services. Very few of these plans have been of-
fered by insurers.
In testimony before Congress, Donald Young, president of the Health
Insurance Association of America, pointed out that the three plans that
cover the Part B deductible are twice as popular as the other seven plans
combined.53  According to Young, “this popularity is likely due to the
fact that Medicare beneficiaries are risk averse and derive a great deal
of financial and personal security from their supplemental insurance
policies.” Moreover, he also pointed to reports warning that restrictions
on first-dollar coverage might limit access to necessary care, noting that
the health of some policyholders might be adversely affected. Supple-
mental insurance’s effect on health is unclear, according to a compre-
hensive literature review by Adam Atherly.54
As indicated, few of the new high-deductible Medigap products have
actually been sold. Insurers have not actively marketed these plans be-
cause of administrative difficulties and higher costs. Also, they main-
tain, consumers do not want these high-deductible options. According
to Young, the biggest hurdle to the sale of these products is that benefi-
ciaries expect Medigap plans to provide first-dollar coverage. Consumer
advocate Bonnie Burns, a member of the NAIC working group respon-
sible for designing the ten benefit packages, agrees. She states that “some
people would risk going without a Medigap policy if it were not for the
open ended Part B coinsurance costs.”55  Prior to Medigap standardiza-
tion, she maintains, consumers were confused by cost sharing on the Part
B coinsurance, and heavy users faced serious repercussions since they
often waited to get care because they had to pay out-of-pocket costs.
MedPAC suggests that these concerns could be mitigated “by requiring
that beneficiaries make a fixed copayment (for example, $5 or $10) at the
time of service rather than pay a percentage of the provider’s charge.”56
Another possibility raised by MedPAC would combine reduced coverage
Few of the new high-
deductible Medigap
products have actually
been sold.
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of Part B coinsurance with an annual cap on cost-sharing, thereby limit-
ing beneficiaries’ liabilities but still exposing them to some costs when
they use care.
Benefit Design
The ten standardized benefit plans have not been updated since they
were established in 1992. Since then, the health care environment has
changed considerably and many argue that the Medigap benefit design
has become outdated. While the standardization of benefits has made
them easier for consumers to understand, it has also stifled experimen-
tation with different types of and levels of coverage, which could po-
tentially reduce costs or enhance the quality of benefits. With only ten
packages, standardization necessarily limits choice of benefit combina-
tions for consumers. Yet, since the majority of Medigap policyholders
choose three plan types, it appears that the remaining seven options do
not meet consumer or insurer needs.
In addition, many of the benefits deemed necessary in 1992 have lost
value due to changes in what Medicare covers. For example, with re-
gard to preventive benefits, several screening tests that were identified
during the development of the standardized plans are now Medicare-
covered services and sometimes result in duplicate billing under Medi-
care and Medigap. Similarly, coverage for services from physicians who
do not accept assignment (Part B excess charges) has little value to poli-
cyholders since “program assignment rates are well over 90 percent,
and physicians are not permitted to charge more than 15 percent above
the Medicare fee schedule.”57
The “at-home recovery” benefit has also proven confusing to beneficia-
ries and not particularly useful. The benefit has many coverage limita-
tions and exclusions that require it to be carefully coordinated with
Medicare-approved home health services. Some analysts have suggested
that it might be appropriate to restructure the at-home recovery benefit
to cover only visits that occur after the beneficiary has been discharged
from the Medicare-approved home health plan of care.58
Some Medigap experts have suggested offering fewer standardized plans
or allowing plans to add optional riders (such as those allowed in Wis-
consin and Minnesota). Some private insurers have promoted more flex-
ibility in benefit design. Others have encouraged more expansion of the
private fee-for-service or preferred provider options under M+C, which
allows insurers the flexibility to depart from standardized Medigap
options and offer additional benefits. On August 27, 2002, the Bush ad-
ministration announced that it will expand PPO options under M+C.59
In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services announced
proposed changes to the Medicare Select program. Medicare Select plans
were authorized under OBRA 1990, but only 9 percent of beneficiaries
Many of the benefits
deemed necessary in
1992 have lost value
due to changes in what
Medicare covers.
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enrolled in standardized Medigap plans had a Medicare Select plan in
1999.60  Under these plans, beneficiaries are limited to choosing among
hospitals and physicians in the plan’s network except in emergencies.
Medicare Select insurers will now be permitted to waive Part B cost-
sharing amounts. The Bush administration believes this will encour-
age Medicare Select insurers to expand their provider networks to
include more physicians and suppliers, as well as hospitals. Other ana-
lysts speculate that insurers are likely to innovate in their prescription
drug offerings.
Flexibility in benefit design, however, moves away from the original
goals of standardization. If the benefit package varies greatly, risk seg-
mentation is more likely. Many of those who originally favored fewer
plans now believe that the number should not be changed in order to
avoid further confusion because the elderly have become accustomed to
the ten plans. “In short, their plea is for stability over perfection,” ac-
cording to Lauren McCormack and colleagues.61
Another option might be to expand Medicare benefits to cover some or
all of the gaps. In its latest congressional report, MedPAC put forward
some illustrative examples of a comprehensive Medicare benefit pack-
age that would include modified cost sharing as well as additional ben-
efits such as prescription drug benefits and stop-loss coverage. The com-
mission concludes that under one proposed scenario of an expanded
Medicare package “beneficiaries with Medigap policies might decide
they no longer need supplemental insurance to cover their reduced
health care liabilities. Medigap insurers also might determine that they
could no longer profitably offer plans that spread relatively fixed ad-
ministrative costs across a reduced scope of benefits.”62
Stop-loss protections—that is, a guaranteed amount above which the
government (and not the individual) pays for any additional cost shar-
ing—appear to be the key to benefit package reforms that meet con-
sumer needs. However, in testimony before Congress, Marilyn Moon
warns that “The problem with stop loss has always been that when it is
low enough to be attractive, it becomes very expensive.”63
CONCLUSION
In MedPAC’s assessment, Medicare’s current benefit structure reflects
“policymakers’ decisions about how to balance financial protection on
the one hand against the financial burden on taxpayers and beneficia-
ries on the other.”64  Medigap reforms are subject to the same trade-offs.
If benefits are made more generous, enrollees will likely experience
higher premiums.
Efforts to reform Medicare are complicated by the myriad of supplemen-
tal insurance products available to beneficiaries. Medicare’s coverage gaps
create a system that is segmented and pluralistic. Varying coverage,
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rating, and enrollment practices across plan types make it difficult for
consumers to compare their options. Budget constraints mean that the
tension between providing catastrophic coverage to the sickest benefi-
ciaries and first-dollar coverage for those who are risk-averse will likely
worsen with time. In light of changes to retiree health insurance plans
and M+C plans, the time seems ripe to reconsider whether the Medigap
market is fulfilling policymakers’ goals and expectations.
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